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Abstract
I build a two-country general oligopolistic equilibrium model, in which sectors differ in
emissions and technologies, and pollution can be transboundary. I derive the optimal
bilateral environmental policy for the economy as a whole, for the cases in which the
environmental damage either linearly or quadratically increases in total pollution. The
analysis highlights that the optimal emission tax can even be negative, and bilateral trade
liberalization should be matched with either a rise or a fall in the optimal emission tax.
The moments of the emission distribution and technology distribution across sectors are
fundamental to implement optimal environmental policies.
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1 Introduction
The environment has increasingly become a key topic for policymakers. In fact, they increas-
ingly care not just about pollution generated within their own economy but also about the trans-
boundary effects of pollution produced elsewhere in the world. Environmental policy is able to
change the balance of competition in many sectors and, in turn, the demands for production fac-
tors. Given the oligopolistic nature of many sectors of several economies,1 it is interesting and
useful to analyze the environmental policy in a full-fledged multi-sector general equilibrium
model of international trade with imperfect (strategic) competition. A theoretical framework to
consider environmental policy in general equilibrium can generate relevant findings for a better
policy implementation.
The adoption of oligopolistic competition to analyze environmental issues is well-
established in literature. For example, the first studies of strategic environmental policies date
back to the first half of the 1990s (e.g., Ulph, 1992, Conrad, 1993, Barrett, 1994, Kennedy,
1994, Rauscher, 1994).2 Nevertheless, earlier studies have looked at cases in which policy-
makers can credibly pre-commit and unilaterally (non-cooperatively) choose the optimal en-
vironmental policy for a single sector to help domestic firms in competing with foreign ones.
Nevertheless, this literature is in partial equilibrium and does not consider feedback from factor
markets.3 This fact was probably due to the dearth of full-fledged general equilibrium frame-
works in which to embed oligopolistic competition in a theoretically consistent way.4 Since
then a theoretically consistent approach to embed oligopoly in general equilibrium has been
developed. This approach relies on the concept of general oligopolistic equilibrium (hereafter
GOLE) as developed by Neary (2003a;b), in which the economy is assumed to be composed
by a continuum of oligopolistic sectors linked through factor markets.5
In this paper, I study how environmental and trade policies interact. To do so, I adopt the
GOLE approach. The only study that also adopts the GOLE approach to study environmental
1For a recent and wide empirical evidence see, for example, Mayer and Ottaviano (2008).
2See Ulph (1994), Sturm (2003), and Requate (2005) for surveys of this literature and subsequent contributions.
3Much of the partial equilibrium literature of international trade and imperfect competition additionally ab-
stracts from consumption, by adopting a third-country framework.
4A first intuitive attempt to embed strategic environmental policy in general equilibrium was provided by
Rauscher (1994) in a third-country framework. Subsequent studies (e.g., Elbers and Withagen, 2002; 2003) have
also addressed the consumption, by relying on numerical simulations, without providing closed-form solutions.
As better explained below, the general equilibrium concept adopted in this paper is different from the one in which
an outside sector plays the role of nume´raire (e.g., Markusen et al., 1993). For further discussion on the issue of
the outside sector in oligopoly studies see, for example, Leahy and Neary (2011).
5For details on the GOLE approach, see also Neary (2016). Colacicco (2015) provides a comprehensive survey
of the GOLE applications.
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issues is the one of Richter (2014). Nevertheless, he focuses on the optimal environmental
policy for single sectors. In a framework with segmented markets and perceived environmen-
tal damage as a linear function of the total pollution, Richter replicates a partial equilibrium
analysis, and studies how partial trade liberalisation affects environmental policies in general
equilibrium. He assumes that policymakers have perfect information on single markets and set
environmental policies (i.e., emission taxes) at the sector level, to maximize sectoral welfare,
which is given by the standard form as derived in partial equilibrium.6 This means that policy-
makers have not a global knowledge of the economy in which they operate (e.g., how national
income and factor rewards are affected by their policies).
Dixit and Grossman (1986) highlighted the empirical difficulty in obtaining the necessary
information for targeting sectors.7 So far, the GOLE literature has disregarded a more direct
role of policymakers, and how they interact to set their policies for the economy as a whole.
An exception is provided by Palokangas (2015), who focuses on interacting policymakers to
analyze how wages are endogenously determined. However, unlike the present paper, he does
not look at policies to affect the economy as a whole.
I do not consider optimal policy decisions at the sector level. Instead, in the model I present
here, policymakers can levy only emission taxes to affect their economies as a whole, assuming
that these policies are uniform across sectors (viz., no sector targeting). I consider that the per-
ceived environmental damage can be either a linear function of the total pollution, as in Richter
(2014), or a convex (quadratic) one. In addition, unlike Richter (2014) who assumes that all
sectors have the same emission rate and use the same technology, I allow sectors to differ both
in emission rates and technologies. These features cannot, of course, be addressed in a par-
tial equilibrium (single-sector) analysis. I am interested in deriving the optimal environmental
policy for two countries as a whole (i.e., cooperative equilibrium), because it is much more dif-
ficult to reach an efficient policy with non-cooperative countries and transboundary pollution.
For the rest, I adopt the simplest possible theoretical set-up to convey insights.8
The paper continues as follows. The next section presents a general equilibrium model with
6In partial equilibrium studies, welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, revenues
from import tariffs and emission taxes, as well as environmental damage.
7See also Flam and Helpman (1987) and Krugman (1987).
8Richter (2014) distinguishes between sectors open and closed to international trade, in which more than two
oligopolistic firms compete. I adopt two simplifications: i) all sectors are open to international trade; ii) interna-
tional duopoly takes place therein. The main ingredients of the framework presented here are adopted by many
partial equilibrium studies: two countries, segmented markets, oligopolistic (Cournot) competition, transboundary
pollution from production, and governments can levy import tariffs and emission taxes.
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many segmented markets in which firms strategically compete and generate pollution, which
can be transboundary. I begin with the simplest framework to lay the groundwork for the other
sections: the optimal environmental policy is derived for the case in which the perceived envi-
ronmental damage is a linear function of the total pollution and sectors use the same technology
but differ in emission rates. In Section 3, the analysis is extended to consider technologically
heterogeneous sectors. In Section 4, I consider the alternative assumption concerning the per-
ceived environmental damage as a convex (quadratic) function of total pollution. Section 5
concludes.
2 Basic model
Two identical countries, H and F, trade homogeneous goods. I focus on H’s equations. Sim-
ilar equations hold for F. Asterisked variables refer to F.9 For the moment, I assume that the
perceived environmental damage is a linear function of the total pollution, and sectors use the
same technology but differ in emission rates. To focus on this paper’s goal, I abstract from
abatement technology issues.
2.1 Preferences: consumption and environmental damage
The representative consumer in H is endowed with L units of labor, inelastically supplied (for
a wage rate, w > 0) to a perfectly competitive labor market. Preferences are given by a utility
function over outputs of a continuum of sectors of unit mass indexed by z ∈ [0, 1], and over the
perceived environmental damage from total pollution:
(1) U [{x(z)} , {D(z)}] =
∫ 1
0
ax(z)− 1
2
[x(z)]2 dz − α
∫ 1
0
D(z)dz ,
with a > 0 and x(z) the consumption of the good produced in sector z. The parameter α ≥ 0
accounts for the environmental concern (i.e., marginal disutility of total pollution). The per-
ceived environmental damage (or negative externality) is given by the sum (i.e., integral) of the
pollution from each sector, D(z).
Production in each sector generates proportional pollution such that D(z) ≡ d(z)+βd∗(z),
with d(z) ≡ γ(z) [yH(z) + yF (z)] and d∗(z) ≡ γ(z) [y∗H(z) + y∗F (z)], where yH(z) and yF (z)
9A file for all mathematical derivations and numerical simulations is available from the author upon request.
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stand for the H firm’s output in sector z sold in H and F, respectively, as well as y∗H(z) and y
∗
F (z)
stand for the F firm’s output in sector z sold in H and F, respectively. The parameter β ∈ [0, 1]
represents the transboundary pollution rate, assuming it is the same for both countries.10
The consumer maximizes Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint. Unlike governments,
consumers are too small to internalize the environmental damage in their decisions. Hence, the
representative consumer does not consider the environmental damage in her problem:
(2) max
x(z)∈R+, z∈[0,1]
U [{x(z)}, ·] s.t.
∫ 1
0
p(z)x(z)dz ≤ I ,
where I stands for national income and p(z) stands for the price of x(z) sold in H. Solving the
consumer’s problem in Eq. (2) gives the linear inverse demand function for the interior optimal
consumption of x(z):11
(3) λp(z) = a− x(z) ,
where λ stands for the marginal utility of national income. I assume throughout that p(z) > 0
for any z, and non satiation (λ > 0).12 As standard in the GOLE literature, I choose λ as
nume´raire (λ = 1).
2.2 Partial equilibrium: technology, production, and pollution
Governments are able to pre-commit credibly to their policies before firms compete. I begin
from the competition within sectors. Firms compete a` la Cournot, taking as given factor rewards
and policies. Labor can costlessly move across sectors, therefore the wage rates are determined
at the country level. Nevertheless, labor cannot migrate abroad. For the moment, I assume that
H and F firms in each sector use the same technology with constant returns to scale. I normalize
the unit labor requirement to unity for all firms. Nevertheless, firms across sectors differ in their
emission rate, γ(z), for each unit of output they produce.
Product markets are segmented. Trade barriers are given by a specific (per-unit) import tar-
10For β > 0 one can think of, for example, ammonia (NH3), carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO),
methane (CH4), nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulphur dioxide (SO2), volatile organic compounds, or persistent organic
pollutants.
11Sub-utility functions are strictly concave, therefore first-order conditions for utility maximization are both
necessary and sufficient.
12In general equilibrium λ is endogenous and depends on prices and national income.
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iff, t, common (uniform) across sectors.13 The same structure is adopted for the emissions tax,
τ . I assume that duopolistic competition between H firm and F firm takes place in all sectors.14
Given the cooperative behavior of the governments for the equilibrium under analysis, one can
set τ = τ ∗ in the profit functions. As the focus of the paper is on the environmental policy, I
also set t = t∗ and treat import tariffs as exogenous (e.g., fixed by a trade agreement). Firms
in H maximize their own profits subject to the (perceived) inverse demand functions in Eq. (3),
by taking as given direct rivals’ outputs, policies, and wage rates:
(4) max
yH(z),yF (z)∈R+ , z∈[0,1]
pi(z) ≡ [p(z)− w − τγ(z)]yH(z) + [p∗(z)− w − τγ(z)− t] yF (z) .
Firms in F similarly solve
(5)
max
y∗H(z),y
∗
F (z)∈R+ , z∈[0,1]
pi∗(z) ≡ [p∗(z)− w∗ − τγ(z)] y∗F (z) + [p(z)− w∗ − τγ(z)− t] y∗H(z) ,
subject to the (perceived) inverse demand functions of the representative consumer in F, similar
to Eq. (3).
Imposing market clearing conditions and deriving first-order conditions from firms’ prob-
lems in Eqs. (4) and (5) yields firms’ best response functions in any sector.15 Solving the given
system of first-order conditions yields the Cournot–Nash equilibrium outputs for any H firm
and F firm that sell in H:
(6) yH(z)CN =
a− 2w + w∗ + t− τγ(z)
3
and
(7) y∗H(z)
CN =
a+ w − 2w∗ − 2t− τγ(z)
3
,
where CN stands for Cournot–Nash equilibrium. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs for
13Specific import tariffs can isomorphically represent other per-unit trade frictions. Hummels and Skiba (2004)
and Irarrazabal et al. (2015) provide evidence for the empirical relevance of additive trade costs. The World Trade
Report 2012 (WTO, 2012) highlights the importance of non-tariff measures. See also Baldwin and Evenett (2009)
and Kee et al. (2009).
14International duopoly is adopted by other GOLE studies whenever the focus is not on competition policy (e.g.,
Bastos and Straume, 2012, Neary and Tharakan, 2012, Egger et al., 2015). Duopoly is also commonly assumed
in the literature of environmental economics.
15Second-order conditions for interior solutions are satisfied, as profits are strictly concave functions in outputs.
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any H firm and F firm that sell in F are
(8) yF (z)CN =
a− 2w + w∗ − 2t− τγ(z)
3
and
(9) y∗F (z)
CN =
a+ w − 2w∗ + t− τγ(z)
3
.
2.3 General equilibrium: labor markets and wages
Without loss of generality, wage income and aggregate profits are costlessly distributed to the
consumer. Revenue from import tariffs and emission taxes is returned to the consumer as a
lump sum. As H and F are identical, L = L∗. With full employment, the labor market clearing
condition for H is
L =
∫ 1
0
[yH(z) + yF (z)] dz ,
and for F is
L =
∫ 1
0
[y∗H(z) + y
∗
F (z)] dz .
Using Eqs. (6)–(9) and solving simultaneously the labor market clearing conditions for
both wage rates yields
(10) w = w∗ =
2a− 3L− t− 2τµγ1
2
≡ W ,
with µγ1 ≡
∫ 1
0
γ(z)dz.
Any firm’s Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are therefore
(11) yH(z)CN =
a−W + t− τγ(z)
3
= y∗F (z)
CN
and
(12) yF (z)CN =
a−W − 2t− τγ(z)
3
= y∗H(z)
CN .
This implies d(z) = d∗(z) for any z. Notice that p(z)CN = p∗(z)CN for any z, guaranteeing
7
balanced trade, given Eq. (12).16
2.4 Social welfare and optimal environmental policy
The representative consumer approach with quasi-homothetic preferences allows deriving so-
cial welfare through the indirect utility function. The latter can be obtained by inverting Eq.
(3), plugging these direct demand functions into Eq. (1), and recalling the definition of D(z),
which can be written as D(z) = (1 + β)γ(z)[a− p(z)].
Abstracting from some constants, the indirect utility function is
(13) V ≡ −µp2 + α(1 + β)
∫ 1
0
γ(z)p(z)dz ,
with µp2 ≡
∫ 1
0
[p(z)]2 dz.17 Using Eqs. (10)–(12), one can write Eq. (13) in equilibrium in
terms of exogenous variables and parameters as (abstracting from some constants)
(14) V = −4
9
ξγτ 2 +
2
3
α(1 + β)ξγτ ,
with ξγ ≡ µγ2 − (µγ1)2 and µγ2 ≡
∫ 1
0
[γ(z)]2 dz. Once the general equilibrium feedback is
taken into account, and all adjustment effects are aggregated across sectors, social welfare is
independent of the import tariff.
Next, I analyze the first stage of the game, in which governments set their environmen-
tal policies and are aware of their economies as a whole. Hence, the first-order condition to
maximize V in Eq. (14) with respect to τ is18
∂V
∂τ
= 0 = ξγ
[
−8
9
τ +
2
3
α(1 + β)
]
.
16Given that H and F share the wage rate, and that H and F firms in each sector produce the same output for
their domestic and foreign markets, then H and F also share Cournot-Nash aggregate profits and the revenue from
import tariffs and emission taxes. Hence, H and F share the national income. This means they also share the
marginal utility of national income. This allows to derive closed-form solutions without introducing the foreign
marginal utility of national income, as λ = λ∗ = 1.
17The parameter α can be endogenous and derived in a political economy framework. Nevertheless, Baldwin
(1987) showed that exogenous weights in governments’ objective functions are equivalent to those originated from
more explicit considerations of political economy.
18Being H and F identical, the situation in which governments cooperate to maximize their joint social welfare is
equivalent to the one in which one maximizes one country’s social welfare (that is, argmaxτ 2V ≡ argmaxτ V ).
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Therefore, for ξγ > 0 the optimal emission tax is:19
(15) τA =
3
4
α(1 + β) ≥ 0 .
If α > 0, then the optimal bilateral emission tax for both economies as a whole is positive and
monotonically increasing in the transboundary pollution rate and environmental concern.
The fact that social welfare is unaffected by changes in the import tariff is unsatisfactory,
and due to the assumption that all sectors use the same technology.20 Hence, in the next section,
I address this issue and relax this assumption, by introducing technologically heterogeneous
sectors.
3 Technologically heterogeneous sectors
Assume that firms in each sector use a specific unit labor requirement h(z). Then, firms in H
maximize their own profits as before:
max
yH(z),yF (z)∈R+ , z∈[0,1]
pi(z) ≡ [p(z)− wh(z)− τγ(z)] yH(z)+[p∗(z)− wh(z)− τγ(z)− t] yF (z) .
Firms in F similarly solve
max
y∗H(z),y
∗
F (z)∈R+ , z∈[0,1]
pi∗(z) ≡ [p∗(z)− w∗h(z)− τγ(z)] y∗F (z)+[p(z)− w∗h(z)− τγ(z)− t] y∗H(z) .
The corresponding Cournot–Nash equilibrium outputs are
(16) yH(z)CN =
a− 2wh(z) + w∗h(z) + t− τγ(z)
3
,
(17) y∗H(z)
CN =
a+ wh(z)− 2w∗h(z)− 2t− τγ(z)
3
,
(18) yF (z)CN =
a− 2wh(z) + w∗h(z)− 2t− τγ(z)
3
,
19For ξγ > 0 the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied.
20Neary (2003a;b) named this situation “featureless economy”.
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and
(19) y∗F (z)
CN =
a+ wh(z)− 2w∗h(z) + t− τγ(z)
3
.
With full employment, the labor market clearing condition for H is
L =
∫ 1
0
[yH(z) + yF (z)]h(z)dz ,
and for F is
L =
∫ 1
0
[y∗H(z) + y
∗
F (z)]h(z)dz .
Using Eqs. (16)–(19) and solving simultaneously the labor market clearing conditions for
both wage rates yields
(20) w = w∗ =
2aµh1 − 3L− tµh1 − 2τθ
2µh2
≡ W ,
with µh1 ≡
∫ 1
0
h(z)dz, µh2 ≡
∫ 1
0
[h(z)]2 dz, and θ ≡ ∫ 1
0
h(z)γ(z)dz.
Any firm’s Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are therefore
(21) yH(z)CN =
a−Wh(z) + t− τγ(z)
3
= y∗F (z)
CN
and
(22) yF (z)CN =
a−Wh(z)− 2t− τγ(z)
3
= y∗H(z)
CN .
As before, the symmetry of the equilibrium guarantees balanced trade. Using Eqs. (20)–
(22), one can derive social welfare in Eq. (13) in terms of exogenous variables and parameters.
As the expression of social welfare is cumbersome, I do not report it here. The first-order
condition to maximize social welfare yields the optimal emission tax
(23) τB = τA +
(a+ t)
(
µh1θ − µγ1µh2
)
2
(
µγ2µ
h
2 − θ2
) .
The denominator of the second term in Eq. (23) is positive, given the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity, which also guarantees that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied.21 The
21The second-order condition for a maximum in τB is θ2 − µγ2µh2 < 0. I assume strict negativity of the
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numerator of the second term in Eq. (23) can be either positive or negative. Hence, τB can be
either larger or smaller than τA.22 Yet, τB can be negative as well, as shown in the following
numerical simulation.
The values of the parameters are arbitrarily chosen to have a positive equilibrium wage rate
and interior solutions (i.e., positive equilibrium productions in any domestic and export markets
as well as positive equilibrium prices): a = 200, L = 105, α = 0.5, and β = 0.6. Assume that
the emission rate is increasing in the unit labor requirement. Hence, assume furthermore that
the emission distribution is given by γ(z) = 1 + z2 and the technology distribution is given
by h(z) = ez.23 These distributions have the following moments (i.e., integrals for z from 0
to 1) relevant for the analysis:
[
µγ1 , µ
γ
2 , µ
h
1 , µ
h
2 , θ
]
=
[
4
3
, 28
15
, (e− 1), 1
2
(e2 − 1), (2e− 3)]. For
simplicity, assume free trade (t = 0). Then, τB = −275.949, with w = 268.748, yH(z)CN =
yF (z)
CN = 66.6667 + 91.9831γ(z) − 89.5828h(z), and p(z)CN = 66.6667 − 183.966γ(z) +
179.166h(z).
Notice that in case policymakers are not aware at all of the environmental damage (α = 0),
τA would be zero (see Eq. (15)), but τB can continue to differ from zero. This fact highlights
that emission taxes play a role in industrial policy for the economy as a whole in general equi-
librium, independently of environmental concerns. This is due to the introduced heterogeneity
in the technology across sectors, opening the possibility to have reallocation of labor (whose
supply is fixed) among sectors after policy changes.
As τB is positively related to τA, one has that τB is monotonically increasing in the
transboundary pollution rate and environmental concern. Last, notice that sgn
(
∂τB/∂t
)
=
sgn
(
µh1θ − µγ1µh2
)
. This means that bilateral trade liberalization should be matched with either
a rise or a fall in the optimal emission tax.24 For the special case in which the emission dis-
tribution and technology distribution are independent (i.e., uncorrelated), then θ = µh1µ
γ
1 and
µh1θ − µγ1µh2 < 0, therefore ∂τB/∂t < 0. Namely, if technologies and emissions are uncor-
related across sectors, then bilateral trade liberalization should be matched with a rise in the
emission tax.
second-order condition to avoid the denominator of the second term in Eq. (23) would be null.
22For the special case in which all sectors use the same technology, ξh ≡ µh2 −
(
µh1
)2
= 0 and θ = µγ1
(normalizing µh1 to unity as done before), therefore τ
B reduces to τA.
23These distribution forms have been also adopted by other GOLE studies to represent the technology in numer-
ical simulations (e.g., Egger and Etzel, 2012). One needs to assume two different distributions for the technology
and emissions to avoid the denominator of the second term in Eq. (23) would be null.
24This ambiguous finding, though in partial equilibrium, has been highlighted by Burguet and Sempere (2003).
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4 Environmental damage as a convex function of the total
pollution
Here I consider the alternative, yet well-established in partial equilibrium studies (e.g.,
Kennedy, 1994), assumption concerning the perceived environmental damage as a convex func-
tion of the total pollution. To obtain closed-form solutions, I adopt the quadratic form. Hence,
the utility function in Eq. (1) is simply modified as follows:
U [{x(z)} , {D(z)}] =
∫ 1
0
ax(z)− 1
2
[x(z)]2 dz − α
[∫ 1
0
D(z)dz
]2
.
For the case in which all sectors share the technology (using Eqs. (10)–(12)), the indirect
utility function in equilibrium in terms of exogenous variables and parameters is
(24) V = −4
9
ξγτ 2 − α
9
(1 + β)2 (3Lµγ1 − 2ξγτ)2 .
The first-order condition to maximize V in Eq. (24) with respect to τ is
∂V
∂τ
= 0 = ξγ
[
−8
9
τ +
4
9
α(1 + β)2 (3Lµγ1 − 2ξγτ)
]
.
Therefore, for ξγ > 0 the optimal emission tax is:25
τC =
3α(1 + β)2Lµγ1
2 [1 + α(1 + β)2ξγ]
= τA
2(1 + β)Lµγ1
1 + α(1 + β)2ξγ
≥ 0 .
For α > 0 the optimal bilateral emission tax for both economies as a whole continues to be
positive and monotonically increasing in the transboundary pollution rate and environmental
concern.
For the case of technologically heterogeneous sectors, the expression of social welfare is
cumbersome, therefore it is not reported here. The first-order condition to maximize social
welfare yields the following optimal emission tax:26
τD =
1
Ω
(
a(µγ1µh2−µh1θ)((−1+2α(1+β)2µγ2)µh2−2α(1+β)2θ2)−
µγ1µ
h
2 t((1+α(1+β)2µ2γ)µh2−α(1+β)2θ2)+θ(µh1µh2 t+α(1+β)2(3L+µh1 t)(µγ2µh2−θ2))
)
,
25For ξγ > 0 the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied.
26The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied given the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
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where Ω ≡ 2 (µγ2µh2 − θ2) {[1 + α(1 + β)2µγ2 ]µh2 − α(1 + β)2θ2} > 0. The optimal emission
tax, τD, can continue to be negative.27 For example, consider the following numerical simula-
tion for a free trade scenario. Let a = 200, L = 105, α = 0.1, β = 0.6, γ(z) = 1 + z2, and
h(z) = ez. With respect to the previous simulation, the only change is a smaller α. Then, τD =
−244.177, with w = 244.469, yCNH (z) = yCNF (z) = 66.6667 + 92.1431γ(z) − 89.7048h(z),
and p(z)CN = 66.6667− 184.286γ(z) + 179.41h(z).
As before, in case governments are not aware at all of the environmental damage (α = 0),
τD can continue to differ from zero.28 One can show that sgn
(
∂τD/∂α
)
= sgn
(
∂τD/∂β
)
=
sgn
(
aµγ1µ
h
2 + Lθ − aµh1θ
)
. Last, as before when sectors are technologically heterogeneous,
sgn
(
∂τD/∂t
)
= sgn
(
µh1θ − µγ1µh2
)
.
5 Concluding remarks
The literature on environmental policy and imperfect competition (mostly strategic environ-
mental policy) has relied so far on partial equilibrium analyses. This is the first study that
addresses the environmental policy for the economy as a whole, in a full-fledged general equi-
librium model of international trade with oligopolistic competition within many sectors, de-
riving closed-form solutions. I have provided a simple model to study how import tariffs and
emission taxes interact.
The model derives the optimal bilateral environmental policy, but it does not provide a final
statement on its sign. Indeed, the model highlights that the exact values of the moments of the
emission distribution and technology distribution across sectors are fundamental to understand
the exact environmental policy to be implemented. The only case in which the model indicates
a positive emission tax is when all sectors use the same technology. When sectors are tech-
nologically heterogeneous, something that cannot be addressed in partial equilibrium analysis
of single sectors, the emission tax can be negative as well. Future empirical research should
study how pollution intensities and technologies (i.e., requirements of production factors) are
interrelated. However, the model suggests that emission taxes could be wrong or detrimental
for social welfare. This does not mean that one should give subsidies to polluters. Instead, to
limit the environmental damage this paper’s findings highlight that alternative policy tools can
27For the special case in which all sectors use the same technology, ξh = 0 and θ = µγ1 (normalizing µ
h
1 to
unity), therefore τD reduces to τC .
28For α = 0 one has that τD = τB =
[
(a+ t)
(
µh1θ − µγ1µh2
)]
/
[
2
(
µγ2µ
h
2 − θ2
)]
.
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provide better outcomes in terms of aggregate welfare.
The model can be extended in many directions. First, the emission rate at the sector level
can be endogenous, by considering abatement technologies. Second, policymakers’ environ-
mental concerns can be also endogenous, by making political economy processes explicit, at
the country or sector level. Third, one can consider sector differences in emission rates across
countries. Last, additional features can be adopted, for example by following the various ave-
nues of the GOLE literature (e.g., comparative advantage, multi-product firms, cross-border
mergers, labor unions, wage inequality). The model presented here is just the tip of the iceberg
of what one can do with the GOLE framework to analyze environmental issues. I hope to have
stimulated this research avenue.
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